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SESSION 2: THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE
This panel provides an overview of the current state of protection of moral
rights in the United States, including discussion of the “patchwork”
approach of federal and state laws, as well as judicial opinions.
Panelists:
Allan Adler, Association of American Publishers
Duncan Crabtree-Ireland, SAG-AFTRA
Mickey Osterreicher, National Press Photographers Association
Michael Wolfe, Authors Alliance
Professor Peter K. Yu, Texas A&M University School of Law
Aurelia J. Schultz, U.S. Copyright Office (Moderator)
MISS SCHULTZ: For Session 2 we're covering the U.S. perspective
and to quote one of our esteemed panelists, “when the protection of moral
rights is brought up in the United States, commentators have always
emphasized the differences between continental Europe and the United
States.” Our second panel is going to attempt to explore this unique U.S.
perspective. We're going to try not to delve too much into the comparative
bit that we already covered in the first panel. So I'll take a moment here to
introduce our panelists. Allan Adler is General Counsel and Vice President
for Government Affairs at the Association of American Publishers. And
then, Duncan Crabtree Ireland is Chief Operating Officer and General
Counsel for SAG-AFTRA. Mickey Osterreicher serves as General Counsel
to the National Press Photographers Association. Then we have Michael
Wolfe who is the Executive Director of Authors Alliance, and then
Professor Yu who is Professor of Law and Co-director of the Center for
Law and Intellectual Property at Texas A&M. And there's more information
about their backgrounds in your full program.
So to get started, as we've talked about a little bit earlier, the U.S.
approach is generally described, including in our program, as a patchwork
or sort of a hodgepodge of state and federal law. So to jump in, if you could
each say a little bit about one or two of these kinds of patches and I think,
Allan, we can start with you.
MR. ADLER: Thank you. I was very relieved to hear Eric at the
very end of the panel issue sort of a half-lawyer's disclaimer. I was rather
surprised to see five lawyers on a panel and no opening disclaimer about
whether or not they were expressing views on behalf of a client or
employer, so I will offer one. And the reason for that is chiefly because,
when the House Judiciary Committee’s hearing process to comprehensively
review copyright law considered the issue of moral rights, it did so in a
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hearing in which moral rights was one subject combined with “copyright
term” and “termination rights,” which I think led people to look at that
hearing as kind of a collective check-off box to make sure that even
relatively obscure issues would be addressed in the comprehensive process
of review. But I think it was also a signal that these three issues together,
despite any other pretense the Committee might offer during the process,
are highly unlikely to see any kind of reform legislation proposals as a
result of the hearing process. In the case of moral rights, that is in part
because I think the issue was largely viewed as having been put to rest
during the period in the late 1980s that the previous panel discussed.
For the publishing community at the time, a sufficient amount of
fire and brimstone was mustered to help put that issue to rest in terms of
legislation. I'll give you just a quick example of the kind of language that
was used by the industry at that time. Testimony of the AAP before the
Senate Judiciary Committee said that the hearing raises the threshold policy
question of “whether to superimpose vague, subjective, and wholly
unpredictable new rights upon a longstanding balanced and successful
copyright system.” Tell us what you really think publishers!
Moving forward in time, when the hearing was held two years ago
by the House Judiciary Committee to look at the issue of moral rights, that
view led AAP to make the decision that we were not going to submit a
statement for the record because we didn't have anything new to say about
the issue. When I say nothing new, it's not to say that we don't have
anything to say about the issue at all.
In the 1980s, we said a great deal about the issue, particularly in
terms of concerns not only that the United States had bodies of law which
addressed the issues of integrity and attribution as they appear in 6bis of
Berne, but also because we have laws that distinguish the United States
from the rest of the world, primarily the First Amendment to our
Constitution, which broadly protects freedom of speech from prior restraints
and certain other forms of censoring regulation. Congress and the Supreme
Court have had no difficulty over the years reconciling the First
Amendment with U.S. copyright law, notwithstanding the fact that some
view the copyright law as basically restricting what people can do when
they choose to use someone else’s work of original expression as a form of
speech.
But, nevertheless, it has played a very important role in shaping the
way U.S. copyright law has in fact been implemented and it's also played an
important role with respect to the issue of moral rights with respect to the
issue of defamation law, which is primarily a creature of state law but is
also affected by the First Amendment which makes it to that extent a
creature of federal law as well. At least it is when we're talking about public
figures or even about private figures, but we're dealing with issues of public
concern and public importance.
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So in the area of U.S. laws that were supposed to count for
representing the principles of 6bis on moral rights, one looked at the issue
of integrity and noticed that it represents the ability to object to any
“distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action
in relation to the said work which would be prejudicial to the author's honor
or reputation.”
The interesting thing about that in terms of U.S. defamation law is
that defamation law is probably both broader and narrower than the
“integrity” concept in a number of senses. For one thing, the interesting
thing about the 6bis language is that, when we're talking about derogatory
action that would be prejudicial to the author's honor or reputation, we're
talking about derogatory action in relation to the specific work. We're not
talking about general statements that would be viewed as derogatory or
defamatory to the reputation of the author. It has to be something that
relates to the work that then casts the author in what would be viewed as a
disreputable light. That, of course, is not at all true with respect to
defamatory law in the United States.
The way the law has grown, both as a matter of common law and
in terms of state statutory law, it's a civil wrong. It's a tort. It can be either
written in the form of “libel” or it can be spoken which would make it
“slander.” It could even be expressed other than by writing or by oral
comment. It must be “published” in the sense that a third party must have
seen, heard, or read and understood it to be about the subject and to be
damaging to the subject's reputation.
If you read the language of 6bis, it's not at all clear that this might
just be a direct discussion between a reviewer, for example, and the author
of a work in which the author concludes that the reviewer's comments are
derogatory in the sense that is contemplated under that Berne provision.
But, most importantly in defamation law in the United States, the issue of
the falsity of the facts asserted with respect to the subject individual who
believes that his or her reputation has been harmed is an absolutely critical
matter.
Even to the extent that the First Amendment provides some
breathing room for people to engage in commentary and speech that might
be viewed as derogatory to the subject’s reputation and honor, unless the
subject can point to the falsity of what was said, they really don't have any
kind of legal action with respect to slander or libel under U.S. law, whereas
the comparative notion to defamation in 6bis doesn't address the question of
whether what is said contains an element of falsehood. We've seen a
number of areas where people will engage in what has been referred to as
“libel tourism” to avoid bringing libel actions that really belong in the
United States courts based upon the subject matter and vehicle that was
used to make the statements at issue. They tend to travel to other countries,
particularly the U.K., to file libel actions because of the differences in the
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coverage of defamation and what has to be proven in order to be able to
make a case.
In most areas of the United States, it's also important that a
defamatory statement be one that is unprivileged. In other words, if you are
in the situation where you are a witness in a trial proceeding, whether it's
civil or criminal, your testimony is privileged with respect to any character
of it that might be viewed as defamatory because it is part of a process in
which what you say is being considered more for its relationship to the
particular cause of action or the particular charged offense, than it has to do
with the character of the particular individual that matter dealt with. So
that's another important element.
And of course as I mentioned earlier, there is this distinction made
in U.S. law between how the law treats a public figure and treats a private
figure, and generally speaking, as we know under the N.Y. Times v. Sullivan
doctrine, when we're talking about a public figure, an individual who's an
elected official or somebody else who has entered into the public spotlight
as far as society is concerned, generally speaking they have a heavier
burden of proof with respect to an action for defamation, whether it's libel
or slander and have to demonstrate “actual malice,” which is not only that
the statements involved were false, but that speaker either knew they were
false or spoke them in reckless disregard for whether or not they were true
or false. None of this is reflected in the language of 6bis with respect to the
idea of harm to reputation or honor. Most importantly, perhaps, in the
United States an action for defamation does not survive the death of the
subject of the alleged defamation.
So you had a very famous case a number of years ago where the
children of the noted actor Errol Flynn attempted to sue for defamation of
Flynn's character based upon a book that was written as an unauthorized
biography of Flynn that alleged that he was a Nazi sympathizer. And, of
course, the court basically said that such an action, had it they been brought
by Mr. Flynn during his life, might've had some validity but had no validity
being brought by those who were his heirs or executors of his estate.
So that's a fairly substantial way in which, even though the
doctrine of defamation law in the United States serves as an analog to the
“integrity” right that is protected under 6bis. The two are really quite
different in practice.
MISS SCHULTZ: Thank you, Allan. Duncan, Allan's covered kind
of one way that the right of integrity and the author's reputation can be
protected, can you tell us a little bit about how publicity rights also work in
this area?
MR. CRABTREE-IRELAND: Sure. That'd be great and I'll probably
mention the Berne Convention less than anyone in the entire day. If you're
thinking, “Well I wonder why that would be,” in case you don't know,
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SAG-AFTRA is the union that covers performers, actors, broadcasters,
recording artists and so as I think was mentioned during the esteemed
academic panel before us, largely those individuals have been left out of the
Berne Convention, but thankfully there's the WPPT for our recording artists
and there is the Beijing Treaty. Hopefully, some day it will enter into force
for our audiovisual performers. And so you won't hear a lengthy discussion
of Berne from me but I would like to just talk for a minute about the right of
publicity and its importance, particularly to performers since that's the
perspective that I come from, spending almost 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week, 365 days a year around them.
We've had, I think, a very fascinating academic discussion so far
about how the various elements of moral rights, the patchwork quilt work in
practice. For most performers I think they're more interested in a functional
approach to these rights because what they're interested in is really two
things as has been stated by several other people.
Number one, the question of how they can protect their noneconomic rights, whatever those rights may be, and number two, how they
protect their economic rights. And I would say not necessarily in that order.
Depending on the performer, the reality, of course is that making a living as
a performer is often the number one consideration for most performers. It is
a very difficult career to pursue. It is a lifestyle for most performers where
fighting for the very basic elements of life can be a real challenge. And so
as representatives of performers for those who have not achieved a high
degree of career success, the basic elements—and typically compensation—
are the number one consideration.
And so the right of publicity as part of a broader moral rights
patchwork is really important and, in fact, is utilized in practice (for those
who might be paying attention to it). There have been a number of high
profile cases, litigations, that have been initiated seeking to enforce rights
under the right of publicity.
And I guess I should address what it is or what form it takes at
least here in the U.S. Regrettably it's not really a federalized right. This is a
right that is a sort of common law right that you see in a number of states,
last count I think around twenty-eight or so states have some form of either
common law or statutory right of publicity. There are a few states that are
known as being very receptive to right of publicity statutes that have really
built a strong framework for individuals and performers, in particular from
my perspective, New York, California, Indiana, jumped to mind as a few of
those.
But I do think that it is more than an academic case. There have
been a number of cases in the Ninth Circuit, for example, and in other
circuits in the U.S. where various types of performers have sought to pursue
economic compensation for violations of their rights of publicity ranging
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from commercial advertising types of cases to cases involving particularly
video games in recent years.
There is I think sort of a brand integrity element of this,
particularly that you see in these cases that have made it into the appellate
process, where we've got compensation on the one hand, and where we've
got a desire to really use the right of publicity to protect the types of uses
that are made of image and likeness of individuals. And that's something
that otherwise really you have to rely on a contractual framework to protect
outside of that and maybe the Lanham Act, which thankfully I'm not
responsible for talking about today. And so I think from a performer's
perspective that is a really important option.
We did see recently a very interesting litigation attempting to
pursue this type of brand integrity or personal rights protection through a
copyright angle, which of course is the Google and Garcia case and, you
know, prompted I think some very interesting writings in the Ninth Circuit
level in particular.
So for those who haven't checked out Judge Kozinski's opinion in
that case and the subsequent en banc review results, you should probably do
that, but from my perspective that's the type of case that really never
should've been brought in the first place because a better—a lot of us were
mystified as to why the plaintiff in that case didn't pursue a right of
publicity approach to that issue, rather than the copyright approach that was
pursued. And so from a practical point of view, again a functional point of
view, that's something that we always try to discuss with our members and
our performers, which is to really make sure that they have an
understanding of the right of publicity, because it is a patchwork, of the
various options for seeking to vindicate your rights and making sure that
when you do that you don't create unfortunate or counterproductive
precedents or, you know, cause harm to an otherwise precariously balanced
system.
I think I couldn't wrap up without talking for a minute about the
Beijing Treaty. It's something that's very close to the hearts of our members,
particularly our actor performer members. Obviously our recording artist
members have enjoyed similar protections under the WPPT for some time
and actually when you look at the range of our membership, they speak out
very strongly in favor of the Beijing Treaty both from a—both with the
knowledge of the specifics of the Treaty, which obviously is complex and
takes some time to understand, but also from a more fundamental place
which is the really, in some ways, shocking lack of international recognition
of performers' rights and the audiovisual space for such a long time and the
joy, frankly, that our performers have.
Setting aside the details at the concept of being recognized in a
way that they haven't been so far and even our recording artist members
have stepped up to speak out and say that it's not fair that our actor brothers
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and sisters are not protected in the same way that we as recording artists are
at the international level. And so that's something that's really important to
us. Of course the implementation—someone mentioned earlier that the
President had sent the Treaty to the Senate for ratification and of course the
implementation package has also been made public and there are definitely
some interesting issues that really relate to primarily the anti-bootlegging
area, which is the focus of the implementation package that's going to cause
some interesting debates. And I think there is some disagreement about the
necessity of the scope of the changes that are proposed in the
implementation package, but ultimately it is our hope and desire that moral
rights for audiovisual performers get enshrined in international law in a way
that's meaningful both on a detailed and functional level, but also from sort
of the philosophical and principle level to ensure that we would then finally
have a broad range of rights for all types of performers, moral rights and
economic rights at the international level.
So I think I'll stop there. Thanks.
MISS SCHULTZ: Thank you. And you mentioned your relief at not
discussing the Lanham Act and Eric very helpfully on the last panel
summarized Dastar for us. So Professor Yu, if I could ask you to kind of
pick up that heavy load and tell us a bit about the Lanham Act and using
statutes like that that are not copyright law to help protect something like
moral rights.
PROF. YU: In terms of unfair competition law, the protection we
often rely on is derived from § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Eric has already
mentioned the Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. case. I
suspect Professor Jane Ginsburg will talk a little bit about that case as well.
Section 43(a) offers two different types of protection. The first
type protects against the false designation of origin—specifically, a false
designation that will cause confusion over the “origin, sponsorship, or
approval” of the relevant goods or services. The second type concerns the
misrepresentation of “the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic
origin” of the goods or services. From the standpoint of moral rights
protection, § 43(a) will prevent people from attaching your name to other
people’s works or the name of others to your work. It will also prevent the
nature or quality of your work from being misrepresented.
A good example is the Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos.
case—or what we call the “Monty Python Case” in the classroom. In this
case, ABC cut out 24 minutes of 90-minute TV programming to insert
commercials. It nonetheless broadcasted the work as Monty Python’s
without indicating the unauthorized alteration. When Monty Python saw the
recorded version, they were appalled by the disjointed format that was
shown on TV. Because they did not want their name attached to the
unauthorized edition, Terry Gilliam, their American group member, filed a
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copyright infringement lawsuit in the United States. The court found for
Gilliam based on both copyright law as well as § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
The § 43(a) claim concerned ABC’s passing off of the unauthorized edited
version as Monty Python’s. So, this case is a very good example of how
unfair competition law can be used to protect moral rights.
A lot of you here are probably very concerned about the Supreme
Court case Dastar. This case is about the TV series Crusade in Europe,
which Fox put together based on General Eisenhower’s war memoirs. The
series is no longer protected because Fox failed to renew its copyright.
When Dastar put together a video set to commemorate the fiftieth
anniversary of World War II, it copied and condensed the series, reordered
the material and included new opening and closing credits as well as title
sequences. Dastar, however, mentioned neither Fox nor Eisenhower. Fox
filed a copyright infringement lawsuit, and the case was appealed all the
way up to the U.S. Supreme Court.
When Dastar was before the Court, the big issue was whether Fox
could pursue a § 43(a) claim based on misrepresentation. As Eric mentioned
earlier, the Court’s ultimate focus was on the origin of the physical goods—
that is, who manufactured the videotapes? The Court, however, did not look
at the origin of the footage or the intellectual material captured on the tapes.
There are generally two very different readings of Dastar, causing
lawyers and commentators to debate over how broadly the case should be
read. A broad reading will prevent us from making “false designation of
origin” claims based on the intellectual content inside of the physical goods.
I, however, belong to the camp that reads the case more narrowly. Under a
narrow reading, this case was mostly about content that had already fallen
into the public domain—that is, content no longer protected by copyright.
If you want to go deeper into the facts, you can see that a lot of the
war footage in Fox’s TV series actually originated from Allied Forces. Such
footage did not even belong to Fox. So, there were a lot of facts supporting
the Court’s conclusion that the Lanham Act did not require Dastar to credit
Fox for the re-used material, especially when the series has already entered
the public domain.
In addition to these two readings, some commentators—most
notably, Professor Justin Hughes—have separated the nonattribution issue
from the misattribution issue. Nonattribution concerns the failure to include
the origin of the footage—in this case, the footage that has already gone
into the public domain. By contrast, misattribution relates to situations
similar to those in the Gilliam case—for example, when a wrong name has
been attached or when one has misclaimed altered content as the original.
The Dastar case focuses on nonattribution, not misattribution.
Gilliam, by contrast, focuses on misattribution, not nonattribution. Had the
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facts in the Gilliam case been brought before the Dastar Court, I suspect the
outcome might be somewhat different.
After Dastar, I think the biggest concern for a lot of lawyers and
commentators is that many lower courts have read the case broadly,
reasoning that § 43(a), post-Dastar, gives very limited protection to the
attribution interest in an intellectual work even when that work remains
protected by copyright. Such a broad reading has caused major concern
among those seeking stronger moral rights protection.
MISS SCHULTZ: Thank you. Keeping in the attribution tract there,
earlier in the first panel there was mention of some of the newer WIPO
treaties and of course those include protection for rights management
information or RMI. So Mickey, could you talk to us a bit about RMI
protection as a way for protecting moral rights?
MR. OSTERREICHER: Sure. So with my press background for
those of you who are not connected to the Internet, right across the street I'll
let you know that the Supreme Court denied cert in the Google case, the
book case. So I think that's something people will be talking about today in
our area, but that breaking news aside, earlier somebody talked about it
really wouldn't make any sense to publish a book without somebody's name
on it. And yet with hundreds of millions of images being uploaded almost
daily we are seeing all those images, for the most part, without somebody's
name on it. And the rights management information is critical to at least
visual journalists and visual creators in terms of doing that.
So attribution. Attribution information under moral rights, the
problem moral rights that they have is that it's very narrow. In terms it's got
to be for exhibition. It has to be numbered no more than 200 works—more
than 200 copies made and for the most part those visual images in terms of
photography will not fall under those protections. So what else can we do?
And then we have a number of—now we get into all the acronyms
and again standards for rights management information. There's copyright
management information, CMI, and that's codified under § 1202 of the
DMCA. And we can talk about that. I'm not sure if you want to talk about
that now or when you go to the next question.
Then we have IPTC and EXIF and then PLUS, and we don't really
just yet have a standardization in terms of how we are going to allow people
that create visual works to have that attribution, whether it's information just
about them, and even when there's information there that will help people
identify who it is that created that work. Often times that information that is
referred to often as metadata is stripped out of that—the visual works and
we have pretty much almost instant orphan works, if you will, for an image
that could've been created only moments ago when it goes up on the
Internet and is seen around the world, somebody may not know who it is
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that created it and often times these images are being used without
permission or credit or compensation. And that really is a huge problem.
You were talking about performing artists, in terms of visual artists
trying to have and earn a living doing what they do in this brave new world
of so many millions of images being out there. That's a dilemma that we are
truly, truly faced with.
So, you know, under DMCA there's certainly a number of really
better protections as far as we're concerned that the real question is going to
be then enforcement, and that seems to be a big challenge for everybody in
terms of what they're dealing with. Setting standards and then enforcing
them. So I think maybe as we get into some more questions, I'll get into
more specifics.
MISS SCHULTZ: Okay. Thank you. You mentioned a little bit
there how dealing with photographers is different than other types of visual
arts and we've talked a little bit about VARA in the first panel as well.
Professor Yu, was there anything that you'd like to add on VARA that you
feel we haven't covered in either of the panels so far?
PROF. YU: We have touched on VARA quite a bit, and this is a
topic with which most of you are already familiar. So, I will be brief.
The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 covers three distinct types of
rights. The first is the right of attribution. The second is the right of
integrity. And the third is the right against the destruction of works of
recognized stature.
When you compare VARA with moral rights in other countries—I
think Professor Daniel Gervais has already discussed the statute in the
context of the Berne Convention—you can see that we actually offer
stronger protection than other countries of the right against the destruction
of works of recognized statute. This right is closer to the right of destruction
or, to some extent, the right of integrity, but it is also analogous to the
protection found in state art preservation laws—in California, New York,
and other states. So, VARA is more of a hybrid. If I have to describe this
protection, I would call it “moral rights with U.S. characteristics.”
Going back to the Berne Convention, I think the main concern for
a lot of people is that VARA offers a very narrow scope of protection. Its
protection is limited to only specific categories of visual art: paintings,
drawings, prints, and sculptures. Even within these categories, there are
additional statutory conditions.
A good example concerns still photographs. As we have just heard,
VARA has a limit on the number of copies: the protected photograph has to
exist in a single copy or a limited edition of up to 200 copies. The author
also has to sign and consecutively number all the available photographs. In
addition, the protected photograph has to be “produced for exhibition
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purposes only.” There is actually case law discussing what this particular
phrase means.
In regard to duration, the protection is also more limited than what
we have in the Berne Convention. The standard term of protection under the
Convention is the life of the author plus fifty years. In the United States, the
term has been extended to the life of the author plus seventy years. But in
VARA, the term of protection is only the life of the author. So, the
protection under VARA is much shorter than the duration of copyright.
What is interesting about VARA is that, when we adopted the
statute shortly after joining the Berne Convention, we tried to come up with
something that was uniquely tailored to our needs, interests, and conditions,
but that was also acceptable to other countries. In the end, the protection
under VARA does not fit very well with the Berne Convention. Nor does it
match the traditional scope of the rights of attribution and integrity.
MISS SCHULTZ: Thank you. Allan, could you tell us briefly a little
bit about how contract law can play into this and then we'll turn to Mike and
hear about some specific types of contracts.
MR. ADLER: Yes. Contract law was also one of the reasons why
publishers generally objected to the imposition of a layer of moral rights on
top of the existing economic rights and property rights framework of U.S.
copyright law. They felt that contracts gave the parties both a great degree
of flexibility in terms of how to develop and conduct their own relationship
with respect to the publication of work, but at the same time, in addition to
that flexibility, once a contract was in place and had been fully negotiated, it
also added a great deal of certainty and predictability about the way in
which the relationship would continue and the work at the center of that
relationship would be dealt with.
There is, of course, as has been said, no “attribution” right in U.S.
copyright law specifically, but that's an issue that is typically dealt with
under contract. Many works in the United States are published either
pseudonymously or anonymously, and that's generally dealt with between
the author and the publisher as a matter of contract. And the courts, of
course, generally tend not to try to read between the lines of a contract,
unless it's absolutely necessary to do so, so it's the expressed language of
what's within the four corners of a contract that ultimately shapes the
relationship of the publisher and the author with respect to a particular work
and how copyright law is implemented with respect to that specific work in
the context of that relationship.
One of the curious things that we see though, is that sometimes
there is a situation where the notion of a contract, at least the way licenses
are used today, can put the issues of attribution and integrity in opposition
to each other.
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I'll give you one example. There is a pending rule making at the
Department of Education called the Open Licensing Rule in which the
Department of Education is trying to encourage the creation of open
educational resources through its Direct Competitive Grant Program. And
as a result, what it wants to do with the rule is impose the obligation on any
grant recipient that any copyrightable work that they produce with grant
funds from the Department, would have to be available publicly as an open
educational resource subject to the equivalent of a Creative Commons
“attribution-only” license.
The problem with that is this essentially says to the individual that
if you receive federal funds to create work, that work not only is going to be
subject to adaptation, repurposing and alteration by other parties down the
line, but at each instance it requires that attribution to the original author
must be made. And what that means is that you're going to have a
circumstance where, as a result of that kind of license agreement, and as a
result of receiving federal funding and the contract terms for that funding,
you're going to have the situation where an individual author continues to
be credited as the author of a work after it has been substantially altered,
repurposed, or adapted in ways that that author might find absolutely
appalling and completely at odds with their original purpose in creating that
particular work.
So contracts can do a lot of things. They provide flexibility, they
provide certainty, they allow the parties basically to decide their own fates
within a particular transaction.
Now we have heard on occasion that one of the reasons why moral
rights needs to cut into that kind of flexibility and freedom of contracting is
because frequently the bargaining positions of the parties, between an
author and a publisher, are unequal.
Well, they can be unequal but in two very different directions. A
very well-known author with a very long track record of success in
publication typically will have more leverage than the publisher will in
determining the transactional terms of the next publication if that publisher
wants to become the publisher of the author's next work. Obviously the
situation is reversed when you're dealing with an author—either a first-time
author or an author who has developed no public reputation or record of
success in prior publications.
So, in contrast to the U.S. system, attribution seems to be
something that in civil code countries has to be cabined within the terms of
civil law. This is one of the reasons why publishers continue to feel that a
moral rights regime with that kind of European flavor would be detrimental
to the way copyright has served the interests of this country.
MISS SCHULTZ: So, Mike, Allan mentioned Creative Commons
licenses and they're something that have sometimes been talked about by
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scholars as potentially being America's moral rights. Could you share some
of your thoughts on that and then also on the role of extra-legal norms in the
area?
MR. WOLFE: Absolutely. So Creative Commons licenses, which
I'm sure many or all of you are familiar with, are a suite of public licenses
designed to allow the widespread sharing, and in some cases reuse and
remix, of creative work. And as Allan just recently mentioned, an essential
feature of the contemporary suite of Creative Commons licenses is, in fact,
an attribution requirement.
This is to say that, while Creative Commons licenses can have any
of a number of features, the attribution requirement is a part of all of their
current offerings.1 The most basic license—the Creative Commons
Attribution License, or “CC BY” —allows public sharing and reuse
provided that licensees properly identify the author.
This license can be amended by selecting from a menu of options
any of a number of different requirements. The licensor can elect to
disallow derivative works, or to require that creators of derivative works
share those derivative works under the terms of the same license. Finally,
licensors can limit licensed sharing and reuse to only noncommercial
activity.
And I would like to back up briefly and respond a little bit to one
of Allan's comments about open educational resources and the use of a
Creative Commons attribution license and its impact on tying authors’
identities to downstream derivative works. It is important to note that CC
licenses do provide in some measure for a right of disassociation from
unwelcome derivatives. When an author’s work is modified in such a way
that the author no longer feels comfortable having their name associated
with it, the license gives authors recourse by requiring that a downstream
user remove the attribution on request where reasonably practicable.
Creative Commons licenses are in some sense an interesting and
commonly used contractual solution to the lack of a formal American
attribution problem. However, I wouldn't call them an American solution
entirely. While Creative Commons is an American organization and the
licenses originated in the United States, the licensing scheme is designed to
be global and portable. To that end, Creative Commons licenses are in some
sense designed as much as possible to be compatible with formal moral
1
Interestingly, earlier Creative Commons licenses that did not use the attribution
requirement were retired due to lack of demand.
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rights regimes and, in fact, all of the licenses have a provision that waive
moral rights to the extent necessary to reasonably effectuate their terms, and
only where actually waivable in a given jurisdiction.
In a practical sense, it seems to me that Creative Commons
licenses are an effective means for authors who want to share their work
without price or permissions barriers to receive credit for their work. And
for those authors who give their work away freely, credit and stature are
likely to be the primary currency of their creative economy.
It is helpful here that the CC licenses also try to tackle some of the
fiddlier aspects of what it means to have a functioning attribution regime in
an online environment, by taking the technology seriously. In a digital
environment, the licenses have a machine-readable layer, encouraging
discovery (again, an important consideration for those authors working
primarily for credit), and compliance.
Finally, Creative Commons licenses also have the interesting effect
of encouraging attribution beyond the scope of what might be required
strictly under the terms of the license. So even though the Creative
Commons licenses do not purport to restrict behavior otherwise permitted
by Copyright Act’s exceptions and limitations, they nonetheless encourage
attribution in those cases by making permissions easy and costless for many
use cases. The result is in some sense over-compliance, helping secure
attribution for authors, even where perhaps not absolutely required by the
license itself.
Moving on, I'm actually going to segue directly into a topic that's
not entirely directly related and that's how extra-legal norms stand in place
of moral rights in the United States. So there is, as the panel's discussed, a
significant patchwork of rights that to some extent, if not completely,
provides something akin to moral rights protection to authors in the United
States. But the reality on the ground is substantially more informal, often
just grounded in the norms and practices within and across creative and
consumer communities. Particularly relevant here are the norms
surrounding plagiarism, which are what I'm going to focus on today.
Plagiarism, which as a word interestingly enough comes from the
Latin root for “a kidnapping,” is an extra legal norm that is independently
defined in various communities of practice that cautions against and often
provides extra-legal remedies for uses of works that are in some way
fraudulent or unauthorized—generally in the sense of not including
attribution information so as to suggest that either information or expression
originates from the plagiarizer rather than from the author of the plagiarized
work. Though it is not identical with either, plagiarism speaks more to the
concerns behind the moral right of attribution than it does to those behind
copyright infringement. If these three possible areas of wrongdoing—
plagiarism, failure to attribute, and copyright infringement—were viewed as
a Venn diagram, they would be, mutually, but incompletely, overlapping.
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Some plagiarisms are infringements and, where available, moral rights
violations. Given that plagiarism norms do not turn on permission, and
often extend beyond copyrightable subject matter to ideas, other plagiarisms
might stand independent and apart from these other areas of concern. But in
general, the question resolves to the same key area of concern that
motivates the attribution right: ensuring that the originators of work are
credited for their contributions. One of the virtues of having an extra legal
norm as opposed to a formal statutory right, although I won't draw any
conclusions as to whether this effects the propriety of having a statutory
right, is that within various communities of practice there can be, and in fact
are, different approaches to the question of plagiarism.
In the case of literary works, academia has very strong, and often
enforceable, norms about plagiarism, not all of which are necessarily
entirely consistent with formal attribution rights. For instance, if a research
assistant provides significant contributions to a paper, the fact that their
name does not appear on the text will not generally be considered
plagiarism or in violation of the norms of plagiarism, despite the existence
of real contributions that might rise to the level of requiring attribution
under a statutory model.
Meanwhile, in creative writing, while there are still very strong
norms around plagiarism, these might very well fall short of the formal
academic approach to providing credit. So rather than footnotes or citations
you might have something like Jonathan Letham's excellent essay, The
Ecstasy of Influence, which is perhaps misleadingly subtitled “A
Plagiarism.” There, the work is composed entirely of other people’s
sentences, all the sources of which are credited in a sense by being listed at
the end, but not in-line and without the quotation marks, brackets, and
ellipses and the way that lawyers are all too familiar with. I would posit that
this is an instance where the author has very much complied with his
community’s norms surrounding credit—and thus avoiding plagiarism per
se—while also being outside the bounds of what might be considered
acceptable elsewhere.
These are only the very tip of the iceberg—there are real and
differentiated plagiarism norms in everything from music, to film, to visual
art, to comedy. Perhaps this state of affairs suggests that there is a real
demand for remedies in cases where work is used without attribution, but it
might instead suggest that the communities closest to the behaviors at issue
are capable of self-regulating in accordance with their actual needs on the
ground. In any case, I think any moral rights reform would do well to
remember and respect the different approaches taken by these different
communities.
MISS SCHULTZ: Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen. I know there's
a lot more to cover. We have just a few minutes left for questions from the
audience.
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MR. MOPSIK: Great. Thank you. I want to take exception to a
comment that my friend Allan Adler made. I don't always disagree with
Allan but Allan stated, and good thing I'm paraphrasing, contracts give
flexibility and certainty as to how work would be dealt with. Well, in my
experience in my previous life at ASMP at the Trade Association, over the
years the one thing that we could be certain regarding most textbook
publishing licenses and contracts, was that they were being exceeded. There
was no certainty that the terms of the contract were being upheld. So—and I
agree with you that the leverage issue—I'm not sure that—I think that tilts
still more in favor of the publisher than the number of, I guess, authors that
have significant leverage over a publisher is significantly less than the
number that don't. But as far as contracts were concerned, I don't think they
gave any particular certainty as to what was happening with the future of a
work.
MR. ADLER: Well, let me try to clarify that, Gene, because what I
meant, and I think you've affirmed this, is that the terms of the contract
create certainty. Now whether or not the terms are complied with is another
question. The fact that you are able to point out in a given situation that the
facts of implementation of that contract don't match the terms indicates that
there is at least the possibility and the intention of certainty, but it simply
isn't followed through in terms of performance.
So I think that you still have the notion that contracts are useful for
providing certainly the aspiration toward certainty and predictability, but
you're still dealing with the question ultimately of whether or not the
performance will be faithful to that aspiration.
MR. MOPSIK: Then we still almost agree.
MISS SCHULTZ: Daniel.
MR. GERVAIS: It's also for Allan and also on contracts. So you
underscore the almost sanctity of contract rights so important, yet the
United States has something that authors in other countries envy us which is
the termination of transfers, which seems to be a little bit of government
interference in the contract. And I understand that some of the workarounds, especially that some lawyers in Nashville have tried for
termination of transfers have not all been tested in court but it's a pretty
strong, unwaivable, untransferable right. Is that un-American?
MR. ADLER: I think as you probably would agree Daniel, that's
the exception by far rather than proving the general rule of the way in which
freedom of contract is generally allowed to operate within the copyright
system. And more importantly, drives the copyright system increasingly
because of the increasingly broad role that licensing now plays in the use of
works.
We're seeing within the context of the current copyright review
this battle play out with those who are advocating the importance of
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continued certainty and definition with respect to ownership of rights in a
particular work. But we're also seeing a society that is increasingly content
simply to have access to use the work and is not really interested in
ownership because of the other attributes that ownership usually carries,
which requires maintenance, storage, care, things of that nature, upgrades,
whatever.
So I wouldn't point to the exceptional circumstances of termination
of rights as generally vitiating the rule, which I think continues to be that
contracts play a very important role. One point I would also want to make
here is that, with respect to the right to control the production of derivative
works, there's always going to be some question of what actually is
derivative.
At the far end of the spectrum, I suppose it's possible that using the
common understanding of the word “derivative,” a work can steal
completely the ideas of a prior author's work but not of course be actionable
as copyright infringement because it doesn't take the original expression.
So you have to have a notion of these legal concepts that is
susceptible to clear definition. It's always going to be case that we're going
to have litigation because, as June mentioned, we are a particularly litigious
society and we'll always be trying to game the fringes and the edges of
these rights. But today, for example, we're seeing the discussion of whether
or not remixes and mash-ups are vitiating the derivative works right. If
that's true, I don't know that anybody has related the question of remixes
and mash-ups to moral rights at this point, but it certainly seems to be
another avenue to be explored.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Actually before you go onto the next
question just say—I think one of the topics we didn't discuss but are
thinking about is the importance of contracts with collaborative works and
how the, you know—a lot of challenges would exist in the absence of the
prevalence of contracts for collaborative works like in the audiovisual area
because how you would coordinate and harmonize different participants,
different moral rights, and other rights without contracts would be quite a
complicated scenario.
MR. ADLER: Yes, in fact Eric's history of the late 1980s, at the
time of Berne implementation and immediately thereafter, left out the fact
that, in the hearings that were held about moral rights, the other main issue
being discussed was the impact of moral rights on the work-for-hire
doctrine, and particularly the then-recent decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in the Reid case. At that point, there was a real question as to whether
or not it was possible to create a situation in statutory copyright law that
would accommodate that notion as the Europeans have it, but still be
consistent with the way the Supreme Court interpreted the work-for-hire
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doctrine which depends greatly upon the way in which a written contract
essentially defines the relationships of the parties.
MISS SCHULTZ: Thank you, gentlemen. I'm afraid that's all the
time we have for this session.

